The best way to
describe moral luck would be to say that it is an enigma. It's a
concept which states that the kind of people we are, in our
dispositions, talents, and temperaments, along with the situations we
face are entirely out of our control. Therefore, because we can not
control the factors that play vital roles in shaping our
personalities and moral ideologies, we should not be commended for
the good that we do nor deplored for the immoral things we do. Should
we then, instead of giving praise or blame to each other in response
to certain actions, simply consider the consequences of an action
either fortunate or unfortunate?
Moral luck can be
applied to any situation. For example, I was born into a large
African family that relied heavily on subsistence farming. But my
parents chose to go to school, obtain visa's, and immigrate to the
U.S. in order to continue their schooling and give me and my siblings
an opportunity to live more comfortably than we would have if we
stayed abroad. There are an infinite number of factors, which I had
no control over, that have shaped me into the person that I am today.
To name a few, the family that I was born into, relocating from
Nairobi Kenya to America, and all of the people I've met and the
choices I've had to make (which yielded results both beneficial and
detrimental to my character) are examples of circumstances that I had
no control over. But the pressing question is not whether or not I
can control these circumstances, because clearly I can not; but
rather, since I have no control over these circumstances of which I
am the direct product of, can I be held responsible for my actions if
my actions and the results of my actions are the product of
antecedent and posterior circumstances? Nagel claims, “A person can
be morally responsible only for what he does; but what he does
results from a great deal that he does not do; therefore he is not
morally responsible for what he is and is not responsible for”
(Nagel 498). He goes on to say, “Everything seems to result from
the combined influence of factors, antecedent and posterior to
action, that are not within the agent's control. Since he cannot be
responsible for them, he cannot be responsible for their results”
(Nagel 498). Nagel agrees that moral luck is an extremely
paradoxical issue that is deeply embedded in the concept of
responsibility, but he seems to favor the idea that we should hold no
responsibility for our actions because we are not responsible for our
own existence, our nature, or the choices we have to make (Nagel
498).
Moral Luck is a
serious ethical problem because it not only questions the control we
have over our own actions, but also the responsibility we have for
the results of such actions. Although it may seem like a radical
idea, there is little, if any, evidence that can refute such a claim.
I'm inclined to agree with Nagel in his very bold assertion that
since we are the product of antecedent and posterior circumstances we
are not responsible for our actions (whether or not this should
affect the culpability of criminals or the estimability of good
citizens will be addressed later). I agree only because I simply can
not find any grounds to disprove his allegation. One can easily argue
and say, “we always have a choice, and our choices make us who we
are rather than the antecedent circumstances we are dealt”. But
Nagel presents another claim that trumps such an argument. He uses an
example involving citizens of Nazi Germany saying, “Ordinary
citizens of Nazi Germany had an opportunity to behave heroically by
opposing the regime. They also had an opportunity to behave badly,
and most of them are culpable for having failed this test” (Nagel
497). This example can be used to defend the argument that choices
shape our character rather than circumstances in the sense that the
citizens of Nazi Germany were faced with a moral choice and a choice
was made (regardless of whether or not the choice was moral or
immoral). He then asks, “If one cannot be responsible for
consequences of one's acts due to factors beyond one's control, or
for antecedents of one's acts that are properties of temperament not
subject to one's will, or for the
circumstances that pose one's moral choices, then how can one be
responsible even for the stripped-down acts of the will itself, if
they
are the product of antecedent circumstances outside of the will's
control?” (Nagel 498). In other words, one's will is the
product of circumstances outside of our control, therefore we are not
responsible for the actions of the will; and because the choices we
make come from the will, it would seem that even the choices we make
are produced from circumstances beyond our control. It's an extremely
radical concept. However, even though I'm inclined to agree with it,
I do not believe that anything should be changed in the sense that
criminals be made less culpable for their crimes and heroes are less
esteemed for their heroics. If we accepted Nagel's proposal and
simply labeled certain actions as yielding unfortunate or fortunate
results instead of blaming or praising the person who committed the
act, then bad people would be more inclined to do bad things, and
many others (who would otherwise have been good people), will be
posed with a moral choice to either join the many people doing bad or
be a victim of majority tyranny. Viewing actions externally and
regarding our actions and our characters merely as fortunate or
unfortunate episodes, would have a catastrophic outcome. To conclude,
if the dilemma lies within having to choose between not
holding people responsible for their actions (on grounds that they
are the product of circumstances beyond their control) and holding
people responsible for their actions and, indirectly, for things
outside of their control, I would have to concur with the latter
because it shields us from any greater moral chaos. Whether or not
such an agreement is immoral is a topic for another day.