Moral Luck

The best way to describe moral luck would be to say that it is an enigma. It's a concept which states that the kind of people we are, in our dispositions, talents, and temperaments, along with the situations we face are entirely out of our control. Therefore, because we can not control the factors that play vital roles in shaping our personalities and moral ideologies, we should not be commended for the good that we do nor deplored for the immoral things we do. Should we then, instead of giving praise or blame to each other in response to certain actions, simply consider the consequences of an action either fortunate or unfortunate?

Moral luck can be applied to any situation. For example, I was born into a large African family that relied heavily on subsistence farming. But my parents chose to go to school, obtain visa's, and immigrate to the U.S. in order to continue their schooling and give me and my siblings an opportunity to live more comfortably than we would have if we stayed abroad. There are an infinite number of factors, which I had no control over, that have shaped me into the person that I am today. To name a few, the family that I was born into, relocating from Nairobi Kenya to America, and all of the people I've met and the choices I've had to make (which yielded results both beneficial and detrimental to my character) are examples of circumstances that I had no control over. But the pressing question is not whether or not I can control these circumstances, because clearly I can not; but rather, since I have no control over these circumstances of which I am the direct product of, can I be held responsible for my actions if my actions and the results of my actions are the product of antecedent and posterior circumstances? Nagel claims, “A person can be morally responsible only for what he does; but what he does results from a great deal that he does not do; therefore he is not morally responsible for what he is and is not responsible for” (Nagel 498). He goes on to say, “Everything seems to result from the combined influence of factors, antecedent and posterior to action, that are not within the agent's control. Since he cannot be responsible for them, he cannot be responsible for their results” (Nagel 498). Nagel agrees that moral luck is an extremely paradoxical issue that is deeply embedded in the concept of responsibility, but he seems to favor the idea that we should hold no responsibility for our actions because we are not responsible for our own existence, our nature, or the choices we have to make (Nagel 498).

Moral Luck is a serious ethical problem because it not only questions the control we have over our own actions, but also the responsibility we have for the results of such actions. Although it may seem like a radical idea, there is little, if any, evidence that can refute such a claim. I'm inclined to agree with Nagel in his very bold assertion that since we are the product of antecedent and posterior circumstances we are not responsible for our actions (whether or not this should affect the culpability of criminals or the estimability of good citizens will be addressed later). I agree only because I simply can not find any grounds to disprove his allegation. One can easily argue and say, “we always have a choice, and our choices make us who we are rather than the antecedent circumstances we are dealt”. But Nagel presents another claim that trumps such an argument. He uses an example involving citizens of Nazi Germany saying, “Ordinary citizens of Nazi Germany had an opportunity to behave heroically by opposing the regime. They also had an opportunity to behave badly, and most of them are culpable for having failed this test” (Nagel 497). This example can be used to defend the argument that choices shape our character rather than circumstances in the sense that the citizens of Nazi Germany were faced with a moral choice and a choice was made (regardless of whether or not the choice was moral or immoral). He then asks, “If one cannot be responsible for consequences of one's acts due to factors beyond one's control, or for antecedents of one's acts that are properties of temperament not subject to one's will, or for the circumstances that pose one's moral choices, then how can one be responsible even for the stripped-down acts of the will itself, if they are the product of antecedent circumstances outside of the will's control?” (Nagel 498). In other words, one's will is the product of circumstances outside of our control, therefore we are not responsible for the actions of the will; and because the choices we make come from the will, it would seem that even the choices we make are produced from circumstances beyond our control. It's an extremely radical concept. However, even though I'm inclined to agree with it, I do not believe that anything should be changed in the sense that criminals be made less culpable for their crimes and heroes are less esteemed for their heroics. If we accepted Nagel's proposal and simply labeled certain actions as yielding unfortunate or fortunate results instead of blaming or praising the person who committed the act, then bad people would be more inclined to do bad things, and many others (who would otherwise have been good people), will be posed with a moral choice to either join the many people doing bad or be a victim of majority tyranny. Viewing actions externally and regarding our actions and our characters merely as fortunate or unfortunate episodes, would have a catastrophic outcome. To conclude, if the dilemma lies within having to choose between not holding people responsible for their actions (on grounds that they are the product of circumstances beyond their control) and holding people responsible for their actions and, indirectly, for things outside of their control, I would have to concur with the latter because it shields us from any greater moral chaos. Whether or not such an agreement is immoral is a topic for another day.